Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal
Volume 34
Issue 1 A Tribute to Keith J. Shapiro
2017

The "Cure" to the Homeowner's Bankruptcy Blues: An Analysis of
a Homeowner's Ability to Cure His Mortgage Default under §
1322(b)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code
Andriana Glover

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ebdj

Recommended Citation
Andriana Glover, The "Cure" to the Homeowner's Bankruptcy Blues: An Analysis of a Homeowner's Ability
to Cure His Mortgage Default under § 1322(b)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code, 34 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 89
(2017).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ebdj/vol34/iss1/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

GLOVER_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS2

12/21/2017 1:58 PM

THE “CURE” TO THE HOMEOWNER’S BANKRUPTCY
BLUES: AN ANALYSIS OF A HOMEOWNER’S ABILITY TO
CURE HIS MORTGAGE DEFAULT UNDER § 1322(B)(5) OF
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
ABSTRACT
Chapter 13 bankruptcy is often defaulted homeowners’ only avenue to
avoid foreclosure and remain in home. Debtors seeking to save their homes
usually rely on § 1322(b)(5) which provides that a debtor may “cure” a
default. Many mortgage lenders object to debtors’ plans proposing to cure the
mortgage default on the grounds that the plan is modification of their rights,
forbidden by § 1322(b)(2). The Bankruptcy Code neither defines “cure” nor
“modification,” leaving it up to the courts to draw the line between what
constitutes a permissible cure and a forbidden modification.
The Circuit courts interpret the curative powers broadly: granting the
debtor the ability to provide provisions in his plan that would restore him to
his pre-default conditions. However, in a recent decision, the Fourth Circuit
split from the other circuits’ interpretation. The Fourth Circuit narrowed the
scope of the debtor’s curative powers to allow the debtor to only decelerate the
mortgage debt and continue making his monthly mortgage payments. The
Fourth Circuit erred in interpreting the curative provisions so narrowly. The
court failed to thoroughly apply tools of statutory interpretation and address
key points in its analysis.
A correct and thorough interpretation of the statute supports a broad
interpretation of the curative powers, unrestricted by the anti-modification
provision in § 1322(b)(2). To avoid further error in the courts, Congress
should amend the Code to include a provision that defines a cure as a debtor’s
ability to nullify the consequences of default and restore the debtor to his predefault conditions. Subsequently, Congress should amend the anti-modification
provision in § 1322(b)(2) to include that a cure of a default under paragraphs
(3) and (5) of this subsection is not a modification of the creditor’s rights for
purposes of this section.
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INTRODUCTION
Homeownership—the quintessential American Dream. Purchasing a home
is not only regarded as a sound investment, but homeownership provides an
individual with a strong sense of pride, personal attachment, and community.
However, for many, the American Dream has become a daunting nightmare in
the face of the possibility (or reality) of foreclosure. High unemployment rates,
predatory lending practices by the mortgage companies, and other financial
hardships have made it increasingly difficult for many homeowners to satisfy
their mortgage terms.1 For instance, between 2007 and 2010, approximately
two to three million Americans lost their homes in foreclosure. An additional
two million homeowners were in default and facing the possibility of
foreclosure.2
Foreclosure is a detriment to all parties involved. Lenders must bear the
burden of high transaction costs and legal fees associated with the foreclosure
proceedings. The value of neighboring properties declines.3 Worst of all, the
foreclosed homeowner must bear the monetary and emotional costs associated
with displacement. Filing for chapter 13 bankruptcy is often a last resort for
individuals seeking to avoid foreclosure, and possibly homelessness.4
Approximately ninety-six percent of debtors that file chapter 13 are
homeowners, and seventy-nine percent of chapter 13 plans provide for the
payment of mortgage arrearages.5
Chapter 13 bankruptcy helps a debtor save his home in three ways.6 First,
chapter 13 stays foreclosure proceedings and allows a debtor to create a
repayment plan to pay his arrearages.7 Second, the debtor may be able to
1
Michelle J. White & Ning Zhu, Saving Your Home in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 33,
34 (2010). The sub-prime mortgage crisis was characterized by a number of bad lending practices including
mortgages with balloon payments for low-income individuals; extending loans to individuals with poor credit
histories; and approving individuals for loan amounts that they simple could not afford to repay based on their
debt-to-income ratios. R. Travis Santos, Comment, The Legal Way to Defeat Optimus Sub-Prime, 25 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 285 (2008).
2
White, supra note 1, at 34.
3
See Ken Kahan, Comment, Home Foreclosures under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 30
UCLA L. REV. 637 (1983); see also Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. CT., http://www.uscourts.gov/
services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-13-bankruptcy-basics (last visited Feb. 12, 2017).
4
Kahan, supra note 3, at 638. See also Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Basics, supra, note 3.
5
In comparison, only about nine percent of plans provide for the payment of unsecured debt. White,
supra note 1, at 34.
6
White, supra note 1, at 37.
7
Debtors must simultaneously make their current monthly payments as they become due during the
life of the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (2012). This can be an incredibly difficult for the debtor who is
experiencing financial hardship such as the loss of a job. White, supra note 1, at 37.
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challenge excessive fees and penalties imposed by his home mortgage lender.8
Third, the debtor may also be able to discharge some of his unsecured debt,
allowing him to allocate more income to the payment of his home mortgage
lender.9
This Comment focuses on the first of the three ways that chapter 13 serves
as a vehicle for the debtor to save his home: the plan. Section 1322 of the
Bankruptcy Code (the Code) provides guidance on the contents of a chapter 13
plan.10 Among the permissive provisions listed in § 1322(b), the Code provides
that a debtor may cure any default.11 Most chapter 13 debtors rely on these
provisions to save their homes. Debtors seeking relief from second mortgages
or almost-matured first mortgages may rely on § 1322(b)(3).12 Most mortgage
payments are spread out over twenty to thirty years, and will not have matured
during the life of plan. Therefore, debtors seeking to save their homes
predominately rely on § 1322(b)(5).13 The debtor’s ability to cure the default
on his mortgage loan is not completely unchecked, however. Though a debtor
may propose a plan that cures the mortgage default, § 1322(b)(2) prohibits a
debtor from modifying the rights of his home mortgage lender.
Many mortgage lenders have objected to provisions in debtors’ plans
regarding their mortgage loans. The objection arises from a debtor attempting
to cure the default and the creditor claiming that the debtor is, in fact,
modifying their rights.14 The Code, however, neither defines the phrase “cure a
default” in § 1322(b)(5), nor provides guidance on what “rights” § 1322(b)(2)
prohibits a debtor from modifying.15 The lack of guidance from the Code has
left it up to the courts to draw the line between what constitutes a permissible
cure or a forbidden modification.16

8

White, supra note 1, at 38.
Id.
10
Section 1322(a) lists the provisions that all chapter 13 plans must contain. Section 1322(b) lists the
permissive provisions that a chapter 13 plan may contain. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)–(b) (2012).
11
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3)–(5) (2012).
12
8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1322.07 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
13
Paragraph (5) is the focus of this Comment. However, the analysis is applicable to paragraph (3) as
well. Id. at ¶ 1322.09.
14
See In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1982); Grubbs v. Houston First American Sav. Ass’n, 730
F.2d 236, 238 (5th Cir. 2016); In re Clark, 738 F.2d 869, 871 (7th Cir. 1984); Anderson v. Hancock, 820 F.3d
670, 671 (4th Cir. 2016).
15
E.g., In re Clark, 738 F.2d at 871.
16
See In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 26; Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 238; In re Clark, 738 F.2d at 871; Anderson,
820 F.3d at 671.
9
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Most mortgages contain an acceleration clause.17 This clause provides that
in the event of default, the mortgage lender has the right to declare the entire
mortgage debt due.18 Though acceleration of debt is a common consequence of
default, it is not the only consequence that a homeowner may face if he
defaults on his home mortgage loan. Some mortgage instruments also contain a
default interest clause.19 This clause requires that if the borrower fails to make
his monthly mortgage payment per the terms of the mortgage instrument, the
borrower must pay an increased interest rate for the remainder of the loan.20
The courts generally agree that though the debtor’s promissory note may
grant the creditor rights to accelerate the mortgage, decelerating the mortgage
debt and allowing a debtor to continue making his monthly payments, is a
permissible cure.21 In doing so, the circuits have defined the curative power
broadly. Such a grant of curative power may allow a debtor to return to his predefault conditions.22 However, in April 2016, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the
phrase, “cure the default” in § 1322(b)(5) more narrowly. The Fourth Circuit
definition applies when the debtor’s default resulted in a higher interest rate in
addition to the acceleration of his mortgage.23 The court did three things in its
decision in Anderson v. Hancock. First, the court restricted the definition of
“cure” to only allow the debtor to decelerate his mortgage debt that had been
previously accelerated pursuant to the acceleration clause in the mortgage
instrument.24 Next, the court held that when a debtor attempts to undo any
other events triggered by default, it is a modification of the creditor’s rights
forbidden by § 1322(b)(2).25 Ultimately, the court refused to confirm the
debtor’s plan that allowed the debtor to continue making mortgage payments at
pre-default interest rates.
Consider the following illustration that demonstrates the distinction
between the board and narrow interpretation of curative powers: Deborah
Debtor purchases Blackacre. Her promissory note provides that if she fails to
17
Alex S. Moe, Against Accetturo and Beyond Bukowski: Litigating Notices in Illinois Foreclosures, 48
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 949, 958
18
DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW § 51.08 (Theodore Eisenberg ed., 2017).
19
Mortgage and Note In Default: A Primer On Late Fees And Default Interest, GRAY ROBINSON
http://www.gray-robinson.com/Elerts/100224_Mortgage_and_Note_in_Default.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).
20
See Steven W. Bender, The Enforceability of Default Interest in Real Estate Mortgages, 43 REAL
PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 199.
21
See In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 26; Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 238; In re Clark, 738 F.2d at 871.
22
See In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 26; Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 238; In re Clark, 738 F.2d at 871.
23
Anderson, 820 F.3d at 674.
24
Id.
25
See id.
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make her monthly mortgage payment within thirty days from the due date she
is in default. The promissory note goes on to state that if she defaults, the
mortgage company may accelerate the debt and require her to pay her monthly
mortgage payments in two installments per month rather than one.
When applying the broad interpretation of the curative powers, Deborah
Debtor would be able to create a repayment plan that provides for the
repayment of her arrearages and a return to her pre-default conditions:
unaccelerated debt and paying her monthly mortgage payment in one
installment per month. However, under the narrow interpretation of a cure
proffered by the Fourth Circuit in Anderson, Deborah Debtor would be able to
create a plan that decelerates the debts and allows her to continue making
payments on Blackacre. She would have to continue making those payments in
two installments per month, rather than one. The Fourth Circuit’s narrow
definition of a cure further handicaps the debtor’s attempts to remain in the
debtor’s home and avoid foreclosure. The stakes are too high to leave it to
chance that other circuits will adopt and apply this narrow definition to debtors
seeking to save their homes.
Congress should amend the Code to include a provision that defines a cure
as a debtor’s ability to nullify the consequences of default and restore the
debtor to his pre-default conditions. Additionally, Congress should amend the
anti-modification provision in § 1322(b)(2) to include that a cure of a default
under paragraphs (3) and (5) of this subsection is not a modification of the
creditor’s rights for purposes of this section.
First, this Comment will provide a brief overview of chapter 13 bankruptcy
and a history of the treatment of homeowners in chapter 13. It will then explore
what “rights” the Supreme Court has held that § 1322(b)(2) exempts from
modification. Next, this Comment will discuss how the circuits have
interpreted “cure” as used in section § 1322(b)(5) and how the recent Fourth
Circuit decision narrowed that interpretation. Finally, this Comment will
critique the Fourth Circuit’s analysis employed to interpret the statute, and
apply various intrinsic and extrinsic methods of statutory interpretation to
support the broad interpretation of a “cure” and the amendment to the Code
that this Comment proffers.
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BACKGROUND

A. Overview of Chapter 13 Bankruptcy
Chapter 13 of the Code is titled “Adjustments of Debts of an Individual
With Regular Income.”26 In order to qualify for relief under chapter 13, the
debtor must either reside, be domiciled, or have property in the United States;
the debtor must have regular income; and the debtor must have debts falling
below certain statutory thresholds.27 Unlike chapter 7, the other chapter
commonly used by individual debtors, chapter 13 allows the debtor to remain
in possession of his assets and pay his creditors using his future income, rather
than using the proceeds from the liquidation of his assets.28
All debtors are required to file a plan, in which they proposes how to repay
creditors over the duration of the bankruptcy.29 The debtor is given a great deal
of discretion in developing his plan.30 Section 1322(a) lists only four
mandatory provisions that the plan must include, while § 1322(b) lists ten
permissive provisions, including among them a catchall provision stating that a
plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with this
title.”31 The presiding judge holds a confirmation hearing to determine whether
the debtor’s proposed plan is feasible and if it meets the statutory requirements

26

8 COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 1300.01; see, e.g., 11 U.S.C., ch. 13. (title of chapter) (2012).
DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW, supra note 18, at § 34.02.
28
DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW, supra note 18, at § 34.01. Chapter 13 is similar to a reorganization for
businesses available under chapter 11 of the Code. 8 COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 1300.01.
29
11 U.S.C. § 1321 (2012); DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW, supra note 18, at §34.10.
30
DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW, supra note 18, at §34.10.
31
11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)–(b) (2012); DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW, supra note 18, at § 34.10. The provisions
required to be in every debtor’s plan are as follows:
27

(a) The plan—
(1) shall provide for the submission of all or such portion of future earnings or other future
income of the debtor to the supervision and control of the trustee as is necessary for the execution
of the plan;
(2) shall provide for the full payment, in deferred cash payments, of all claims entitled to priority
under section 507 of this title, unless the holder of a claim agrees to a different treatment of such
claim;
(3) if the plan classifies claims, shall provide the same treatment for each claim within a class;
and
(4) notwithstanding any other provision of this section, may provide for less than full payment of
all amounts owed for a claim entitled to priority under section 507(a)(1)(B) only if the plan
provides that all of the debtor’s projected disposable income for a 5-year period beginning on the
date that the first payment is due under the plan will be applied to make payments under the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (2012).
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or otherwise violates another provision of the Code.32 The debtor’s creditors
are also given an opportunity to object to provisions in the plan.33
If the court confirms the plan, the debtor makes the payments in
accordance with his plan to the trustee.34 The trustee then distributes the funds
to the creditors.35 Sometimes, a change in the debtor’s circumstance may
impede the debtor’s ability to continue making payments as outlined in his
plan. In this event, the debtor may be permitted to modify his plan.36
If a debtor fails to satisfy the obligations of his plan, the debtor may either
convert his case to chapter 7 or seek a hardship discharge under § 1328(b).37
The hardship discharge is available to a debtor if he fulfills three elements.
First, the debtor must show that failure to make the plan payments is due to
circumstances beyond his control and there must also be no fault on the part of
the debtor. Second, the debtor must show that creditors have received at least
what they would have received in a hypothetical chapter 7 bankruptcy. Lastly,
the debtor must show modification of the plan is impossible.38 For example, if
the debtor gets seriously injured, and is unable to work and generate the
income necessary to fund the plan, that may be grounds for a hardship
discharge.39 If the debtor fails to satisfy the obligations of his plan and does not
pursue one of these options, his case is usually dismissed.40
If the debtor successfully satisfies the obligations of his repayment plan,
however, the debtor receives a discharge under § 1328(a).41 This discharge
frees the debtor from liability for all debts provided for by the plan or
disallowed under § 502.42 Certain debts are not dischargeable, which
unfortunately include long-term obligations such as a mortgage. For nondischargeable debts, the debtor must continue making payments on these
obligations once the bankruptcy case is closed.43

32

Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Basics, supra, note 3.
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (2012); 8 COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 1300.01.
38
Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Basics, supra, note 3.
39
Id.
40
8 COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 1300.01.
41
11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2012); 8 COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 1300.01.
42
Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Basics, supra, note 3.
43
Other debts that are not dischargeable under § 1328(a) include “debts for alimony or child support,
certain taxes, debts for most government funded or guaranteed educational loans or benefit overpayments,
33
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Chapter 13 maximizes relief to the debtor by not requiring him to liquidate
his assets and allowing him to create his own repayment plan with a
tremendous amount of flexibility.44 Additionally, chapter 13 allows debtors to
remain in far better credit standing than chapter 7 debtors because they are
viewed as less of a risk by the credit industry.45 Further, chapter 13 “satisfies
many debtors’ desire to avoid the stigma attached to straight bankruptcy and to
retain the pride attendant on being able to meet one’s obligations.”46 In
addition to benefiting the debtor chapter 13 also promotes creditor’s interests
by allowing them to recover from future income of the debtor that would
otherwise be unavailable to the creditors.47
B. History of Chapter 13 Plans
Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 preceded what is known today
as chapter 13 bankruptcy. Chapter XIII allowed debtors to make periodic
payments to a trustee, under the protection of the bankruptcy court, that then
distributed the funds to all the debtor’s creditors until his debts were paid.48
Chapter XIII, however, was “seriously defective.”49 Congress recognized that
chapter XIII plans disregarded their primary purpose of providing the debtor
relief and a fresh start while maximizing recoveries for creditors.50
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 sought to remedy the
shortcomings of its predecessor.51 Congress recognized that allowing a debtor
to create a plan tailored to his unique circumstances yielded the maximum
debts arising from death or personal injury caused by driving while intoxicated or under the influence of drugs,
and debts for restitution or a criminal fine included in a sentence on the debtor’s conviction of a crime.” Id.
44
8 COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 1300.36.
45
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 118 (1977).
46
Id.
47
The general property of the estate provision of the Code excludes the wages of the debtor earned after
the commencement of the case from coming in to the bankruptcy as property of the estate. 11 U.S.C.
§ 506(a)(2) (2012). Therefore, creditors generally would not be able to recover from the future earnings of the
debtor. However, the chapter 13 property of the estate provision of the Code includes post-petition property
and post-petition earnings as property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (2012). See also 8 COLLIER, supra
note 12, at ¶ 1300.36.
48
S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 12 (1978).
49
Id. at 13. Some of the defects of Chapter XIII plans under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 included the
exclusion of self-employed individuals; the deauthorization of spousal joint petitions; the requirement that
unsecured creditors approve the plan; the duration of the plan was left unrestricted; the role of the trustee was
not clearly defined; and discharge relief was arbitrarily withheld for at least three years from a debtor who was
unable to complete his payments due to circumstances for which the debtor should not be held accountable. 8
COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 1300.36.
50
Id.
51
S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 13.
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return to creditors while maximizing relief for the debtor.52 Congress enacted
chapter 13 with the intention of encouraging a chapter 13 plan as the most
effective means of improving debtor relief and creditor recoveries in
bankruptcy for an individual.53
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, chapter XIII plans did not provide an
effective avenue for the debtor to keep his home. For example, a chapter XIII
plan could not be confirmed unless the debtor’s mortgage lender and all other
secured creditors consented to the plan. Also, chapter XIII plans could not
include claims secured by interests in chattel or real property. One of the
“innovation[s]” of chapter 13 under the new Code “was enabling the debtor to
cure defaults on secured claims through the repayment of loan arrearages over
time, even if the terms of the loan or non-bankruptcy law did not give the
borrower this right.”54 By contrast, § 1322(b)(3) allows the debtor to include
provisions in his repayment plan that will allow him to cure any default.
Section 1322(b)(5) extends the curative powers granted in § 1322(b)(3) to
claims on which the final payment will become due after the conclusion of the
plan period. These provisions allow homeowners to avoid foreclosure and
remain in their homes.
C. How the Courts Interpret “Modify the Rights”
The anti-modification provision provides that a chapter 13 plan may not
“modify the rights” of a creditor secured by a lien on the debtor’s principal
residence.55 The Code, however, does not define which rights of the creditor
may not be modified.56
In Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, the Supreme Court interpreted the
anti-modification provision in § 1322(b)(2).57 The Court reasoned that since
52

S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 13.
8 COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 1300.02. Congress further demonstrated its preference for chapter 13
bankruptcy for individual debtors in subsequent bankruptcy acts. In the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984 Congress added a provision to the Code requiring that a chapter 7 debtor certify in his
bankruptcy petition that he had been advised on the availability chapter 13. Congress also added a provision
that in all consumer liquidation cases the debtor’s attorney must certify that he has advised the debtor of relief
available under chapter 13 and the clerk must also give notice to the debtor of the availability of chapter 13
relief. Id. at ¶ 1300.36.
54
John Eggum et al., Saving Homes in Bankruptcy: Housing Affordability and Loan Modification, 2008
UTAH L. REV. 1123, 1155 (2008).
55
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2012).
56
8 COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 1322.06.
57
The Supreme Court interpreted the anti-modification provision in § 1322(b)(2) as it related to the
treatment of an undersecured mortgage clam holder’s bifurcated claim under § 506 (a). The Supreme Court
53
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the Code was silent as to the definition of “rights” it should be interpreted
according to rights granted to creditors by state law.58 Therefore, the creditor’s
rights are those contractual rights reflected in the mortgage instruments.59
These rights include:
the right to repayment of the principal in monthly installments
over a fixed term at specified adjustable rates of interest, the right
to retain the line until the debt is paid off, the right to accelerate
the loan upon default and to proceed against [the debtor’s]
residence by foreclosure and public sale, and the right to bring an
action to recover any deficiency remaining after foreclosure.60
The Court justified its reliance on state law to define what rights of home
mortgage creditors may not be modified under § 1322(b)(2) by the fact that
property interests are the creation of state law.61
In the next paragraph, the Court acknowledged that the Code does impose
some limits on the rights of home mortgage creditors in other provisions.62 The
Court mentioned the automatic stay provision that limits the creditor’s power
to enforce its rights to foreclosure on the debtor’s property in the event of
default.63 The Court also mentioned the curative provision in § 1322(b)(5) as a
“check” on the rights of the creditor.64
D. How the Circuits Interpret “Cure a Default”—Circuit Split
The Code provides that a chapter 13 debtor may include in his plans
provisions that:
(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a
claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is
the debtor’s principal residence, or of holders of unsecured
claims, or leave unaffected the rights of any class of claims;
(5) notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection, provide for
the curing of any default within a reasonable time and

emphasized § 1322(b)(2)’s focus on the rights of mortgage creditors, rather than the claims off the mortgage
creditors. Nobelman v. American. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 326–27 (1993). Also, some parts of Nobelman
have been superseded by statute because of the passage of § 1322(c)(2).
58
Id. at 329.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 330.
63
Id.
64
Id.
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maintenance of payments while the case is pending on any
unsecured claim or secured claim on which the last payment is
due after the date on which the final payment under the plan is
due.65
The circuits have analyzed whether certain provisions in debtors’ plans
constituted a forbidden modification or a permissible cure.66 In their analysis,
each circuit has attempted to fill the hole in the Code by defining what a “cure”
is.67 The Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have interpreted the debtor’s
power to cure his default broadly.68 The Fourth Circuit split from the other
circuits in Anderson, defining cure more narrowly.69
1. Broad Interpretation of a Cure—Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits
The Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have had to resolve the tension
between the curative and anti-modification provisions. In distinguishing
between what constitutes a permissible cure and a forbidden modification, each
of the courts has interpreted the debtor’s ability to cure his default broadly.
a. Second Circuit
In In re Taddeo, the Second Circuit considered whether a cure under
§ 1322(b) of the Code allows a debtor to pay arrearages on a mortgage loan
secured only by the debtor’s principal residence.70 The Taddeos defaulted, and
per the acceleration clause in their mortgage, the Taddeos’ mortgage lender
accelerated their mortgage debt and initiated foreclosure proceedings.71 The
Taddeos then filed a chapter 13 petition.72 The Taddeos’ repayment plan
proposed that they cure their default under § 1322(b)(5) by paying off their
arrearages in installments of $100 per month over the life of the plan.73 The
debtor’s lender objected, contending that this was a prohibited modification of
its rights, in violation of § 1322(b)(2) of the Code.74
65

11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(b)(2)–(5) (2012).
See In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 26; Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 238; In re Clark, 738 F.2d at 871; Anderson,
820 F.3d at 671.
67
See In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 26; Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 238; In re Clark, 738 F.2d at 871; Anderson,
820 F.3d at 671.
68
See In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 26; Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 238; In re Clark, 738 F.2d at 871.
69
See Anderson, 820 F.3d at 671.
70
In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 26.
71
Id. at 25.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 26.
66
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The bankruptcy court held that the Taddeos’ plan to pay their arrearages
and decelerate their mortgage debt was a permissible cure under
§ 1322(b)(5).75 The bankruptcy court reasoned that despite the lender’s right to
accelerate the mortgage debt under New York State law, the Code’s plain
language and legislative history clearly indicate that “when [§ 1322(b)(2) and
§ 1322(b)(5)] are juxtaposed, it is clear that the debtor is permitted to modify
the rights of holders of claims secured by the debtor’s principal residence to
the extent necessary to effect a cure of existing defaults.”76 The bankruptcy
court’s holding was affirmed in the district court.77 The district court held that
the bankruptcy court’s interpretation of the curative and anti-modification
provisions was in line with “the spirit” of chapter 13 bankruptcy: to rehabilitate
the debtor while simultaneously protecting the interests of the debtor’s
creditors.78
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the debtor’s plan may provide for
the paying of the arrearages on the mortgage to cure the default.79 The court
interpreted the statute to conclude that curing a default means “returning the
debtor to [its] pre-default conditions.”80 The court rejected the creditor’s
argument that its rights as a creditor could not be modified in this way because
of § 1322(b)(2).81 The court stated, “[w]e do not believe that the Legislature
labored for five years over this controversial question only to remit consumer
debtors—intended to be primary beneficiaries of the Code—to the harsher
mercies of state law.”82
The court also argued that a cure and a modification are separate and
distinct things.83 The court rejected the idea that the power to cure is a subset
of a modification, despite § 1322(b)(5)’s preface “notwithstanding paragraph
(2) of this subsection . . . ,” because the legislative history and purpose did not
support such an interpretation.84 The court went as far as saying that the
“notwithstanding” clause was “unnecessary.”85 The court cited Congress’
75

In re Taddeo, 9 B.R. 299, 306 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
Id. at 305.
77
In re Taddeo, 15 B.R. 273, 276 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
78
Id. at 275.
79
In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1982).
80
Id.
81
Id. at 25.
82
Id.
83
The court however, did not interpret the phrase “modify the rights” in § 1322(b)(2), nor did the courts
explain how a cure and modification are distinctly different. Id. at 27.
84
Id.
85
Id.
76
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decision to structure § 1322(b) to designate the curative powers and antimodification provisions in separate paragraphs to support its conclusion as
well as testimony by secured creditors in the legislative history in which
secured creditors distinguished a modification from a cure.86
b. Fifth Circuit
In Grubbs v. Houston First American Sav. Association the court considered
whether § 1322(b) of the Code allowed a debtor to include a provision in his
plan to pay the mortgage arrearages, when the mortgage had been accelerated
prior to the debtor filing his chapter 13 petition.87 The debtor took out a second
mortgage on his home. Grubbs’ promissory note provided that upon default,
the second mortgage lender could accelerate the loan, requiring payment in full
of the remaining balance on the note.88 After defaulting, Houston First
informed Grubbs that it had accelerated the loan and initiated foreclosure
proceedings.89 Grubbs filed a chapter 13 petition, in which he filed a plan
proposing to pay off the delinquent and matured amounts on his mortgage over
the life of the plan.90 Houston First objected, contending that a loan secured by
a lien on the debtor’s residence that had been accelerated and matured could
not be reinstated under § 1322(b)(2).91
The bankruptcy court held that the Grubbs’ proposal to pay off his
mortgage arrearages over the life of the plan was a forbidden modification.92
The bankruptcy court reasoned that § 1322(b)(2)’s anti-modification provision
prohibited debtors from curing their defaulted mortgage after the lender had
exercised its rights to accelerate the mortgage debt and initiated foreclosure
proceedings.93 Consequently, the bankruptcy court refused to confirm the
debtor’s proposed repayment plan.94 The district court confirmed the
bankruptcy court’s holding.95
The Fifth Circuit overturned the bankruptcy court’s and the district court’s
decisions. The court relied on an extensive analysis of the legislative history
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 28.
Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 237.
Id. at 237–38.
Id. at 238.
Id.
Id.
Grubbs v. Houston First American Sav. Ass’n, 718 F.2d 694, 695 (5th Cir. 1983).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and intent behind the enactment of § 1322(b) in its analysis.96 The Fifth Circuit
adopted the Second Circuit’s interpretation of a “cure,” quoting the language in
Taddeo quoted in the previous section.97 Similarly to the Second Circuit, the
court also stated the anti-modification provision in § 1322(b)(2) should not be
read to restrict the curative powers granted to debtors in § 1322(b).98
c. Seventh Circuit
In In re Clark the Seventh Circuit considered whether a debtor who filed a
petition for bankruptcy under chapter 13 after a state court had entered a
foreclosure judgment was entitled to cure a default under § 1322(b).99 The
Clarks filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy before the sale of their property but after
the court entered a judgment of foreclosure against them.100 The Clarks’ plan
proposed to pay the mortgage arrearages over the life of the plan, in addition to
their post-petition payments.101 The bank argued that approval of the Clarks’
plan to pay their arrearages was a prohibited modification of their rights as
creditors under § 1322(b)(2).102 The Clarks asserted that the plan was
permissible under the curative powers granted to debtors in § 1322(b)(5).103
The bankruptcy court confirmed the Clarks’ plan, holding that the Clarks’
proposal to pay their arrearages over the life of the plan and reinstate their
mortgage was a permissible cure under § 1322(b)(5).104 The bankruptcy court
relied on the interpretation of the curative and anti-modification provisions in
Taddeo.105 It also reasoned that § 1322(b) was analogous to § 1124(2) of the
Code, which allows acceleration clauses to be nullified in chapter 11 corporate
reorganizations.106 The district court reversed the bankruptcy court’s
decision.107 The district court distinguished this case from Taddeo.108 Unlike in

96

Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 238.
Id. at 241.
98
Id. at 246 (quoting In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1982) (“the notwithstanding clause was
added to emphasize that defaults in mortgages could be cured notwithstanding § 1322(b)(2))).
99
In re Clark, 738 F.2d at 870.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 870–71.
102
Id. at 871.
103
Id. at 872.
104
In re Clark, 32 B.R. 711, 712 (W.D. Wis. 1983).
105
Id.
106
Id. at 712–13.
107
Id. at 716.
108
Id.
97
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Taddeo, the Clarks’ lender had already obtained a judgment of foreclosure
against the debtors.109
To determine whether the plan proposed by the Clarks was a permissible
cure or a forbidden modification, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the phrase
“cure the default.”110 The court interpreted the provision according to its plain
meaning, stating:
Ordinarily, the means by which one cures a default is by paying
all amounts due and owing; however, “cure” is the end and not
the means, and what the term refers to is the restoration of the
way things were before the default. Thus, the plain meaning of
“cure,” as used in § 1322(b)(2) and (5) is to remedy, rectify or
restore matters to the status quo ante.111
Based on this interpretation of a cure, the court reasoned that § 1322(b) allows
a debtor to pay arrearages over the life of a plan to cure a default.112 The court
also reasoned that the legislative history supported this interpretation of a
cure.113
The court acknowledged that “modify” and “cure” are not defined in the
Code.114 However, the court stated that Congress clearly intended them to
mean something different.115 The court supported this conclusion with a canon
of statutory construction that the court should avoid an interpretation of a
109
The court analyzed the reasoning in Taddeo’s holding. The court then went on to explain why
Taddeo’s analysis did not extend to the facts in Clark.

In Taddeo, the court rested its holding on a number of factors: the legislative history that
indicated the Congressional intent to allow debtors to cure defaults and repeal the contractual
consequences; the many similar provisions in the Bankruptcy Code for the curing of defaults
under § 1110(a)(2) (for example, a trustee may continue in possession of aircraft and ships by
curing defaults and making payments in original lease or contract); the policy reasons for
encouraging good faith negotiations among debtors in the Taddeo’s situation; fear of the threat
that “the mortgagee will tip the balance irrevocably by accelerating,”; the concern that
“[c]onditioning a debtor’s right to cure on its having filed a [c]hapter 13 petition prior to
acceleration would prompt unseemly and wasteful races to the courthouse,”; and, finally, the
conclusion that restricting debtors to cure only as provided under state law would leave them
with fewer rights under the new Bankruptcy Code than they would have had under the old Act.
None of these factors supports an expansion of the right to cure beyond the entry of judgment.
Id. at 715.
110
In re Clark, 738 F.2d at 871.
111
Id. at 872.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 871.
115
Id. at 872.
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statutory provision that would render another provision superfluous.116 Though
the court stated that a modification and a cure are distinctly different from each
other, the court did not explore what the distinctions were.117
2. Narrow Interpretation—Fourth Circuit
In Anderson v. Hancock the Fourth Circuit considered whether a cure
under § 1322(b) of the Code allows a debtor to pay his mortgage arrearages
post-acceleration and keep its pre-default interest rate.118 In Anderson, the
debtors purchased a home financed by a loan of $255,000 at an interest rate
of five percent over a span of thirty years.119 The promissory note provided
that if the debtors defaulted the lender could accelerate the debt and initiate
foreclosure proceedings.120 Alternatively, if the lender decided not to pursue
those avenues, the debtors’ interest rate would increase to seven percent
until the loan was paid in full.121 The applicable provision in the note
provided:122
In the event borrower has not paid their monthly obligation within
30 days of the due date, then borrower shall be in default. Upon
that occurrence, the borrower’s interest rate shall increase to
Seven percent (7%) for the remaining term of the loan until paid
in full . . . .
As an alternative to an increase in interest rate upon default . . .
lender may, in the lender’s sole discretion either 1) require
borrower to pay immediately the full amount of principal which
has not been paid and all their interest [the debtor] owe[s] on that
amount . . . or 2) pursue any other rights available to lender under
North Carolina Law.123
After failing to make their mortgage payment within 30 days of it becoming
due, the Andersons were notified that they were in default and that their new
payments would reflect the default interest rate of seven percent.124 The

116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

Id.
Id.
Anderson, 820 F.3d at 671.
Id. at 672.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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debtors failed to make their mortgage payments and, on August 30, 2013, the
mortgage lender initiated foreclosure proceedings.125
The Andersons filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition the following
month.126 The plan proposed that they pay off the arrears over the life of the
plan while making their post-petition monthly payments at a five percent
interest rate: the pre-default interest rate.127 The Hancocks objected to the
Andersons’ plan, arguing that post-petition payments should be made at the
default interest rate of seven percent.128
The bankruptcy court held that the Andersons’ proposed plan to continue
making payments at their pre-default interest rate constituted a modification
prohibited by § 1322(b)(2).129 Relying on Nobelman’s definition of what
creditors’ rights are protected by § 1322(b)(2), the bankruptcy court reasoned
that though a debtor can cure its default, it cannot do so “beyond the four
corners of the document.”130 Since the Andersons’ mortgage instrument stated
that upon default, their interest rate would increase, the Andersons’ repayment
plan could not restore them to their pre-default interest rate.131 The district
court confirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision, but for different reasoning.132
The district court argued that whether the Andersons could return to their predefault interest rate required a construction of the “maintenance of payments”
language in § 1322(b)(2), rather than an interpretation of the term “cure.”133
The court held that “maintenance of payments” means “making the same
principal and interest payments in the note.”134 Consequently, the Andersons
could not restore pre-default interest rate.135
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit considered whether restoring the debtors to
their pre-default interest rate was either a permissible cure under § 1322(b)(5)
or a prohibited modification under § 1322(b)(2) of the Code. 136 The court
125
126
127
128
129

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Anderson, No. 13-05843-8-SWH, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3770, at *24 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Sept. 5,

2014).
130

Id. at *21.
Id. at *23.
132
Jernigan v. Logan (In re Anderson), No. 5:14-CV-690-FL, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49059, at *14
(E.D.N.C. Apr. 6, 2015).
133
In re Anderson, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49059, at *11.
134
Id. (citing In re Martin, 444 B.R. 538, 544 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2011)).
135
Id. at *12.
136
Anderson, 820 F.3d at 673.
131
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interpreted the anti-modification provision to prohibit a plan from altering the
contractually agreed upon interest rate, including an interest rate following a
default by the debtor.137 The court reasoned, primarily by relying on tools of
statutory interpretation, that the power to cure a default granted in § 1322(b)
“does not undo this protection of residential mortgage lender’s fundamental
rights.”138 The court concluded that the phrase “cure a default” only gave a
debtor the power to decelerate his debt and continue making payments on his
loan to avoid foreclosure.139
The Fourth Circuit rejected the debtor’s argument that based on a prior
decision by the Fourth Circuit in Litton v. Wachovia, a cure of a default should
restore a debtor to its pre-default conditions.140 In Litton the court stated “a
‘cure’ merely reinstates a debt to its pre-default position, or it returns the
debtor and creditor to their respective positions before the default”141 The court
in Anderson rejected the debtor’s assertion that this return to pre-default
conditions was nothing more than a deceleration of debt and maintenance of
payments.142 The court rejected the debtor’s attempt to return to their predefault interest rate and ordered that the post-petition payments should reflect
the default rate of interest provided in the note: seven percent.143
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Widely used and accepted methods of statutory interpretation support a
broad interpretation of “cure.” The statute’s text, legislative history, and policy
considerations show that Congress intended that a debtor should be able to
restore himself to his pre-default conditions, notwithstanding the antimodification provision in § 1322(b)(2). The statute shows the debtor’s ability
to cure his default includes, but is not restricted to, simply decelerating his
mortgage debt and continuing making payments. Thus, the Fourth Circuit erred
in holding that the debtors’ plan to continue making payments at their predefault interest rate was a forbidden modification, rather than a permissible
cure.

137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Id. at 675.
Id. at 674.
Id.
Id. at 675.
Litton v. Wachovia (In re Litton), 330 F.3d 636, 644 (4th Cir. 2003).
Anderson v. Hancock, 820 F.3d 670, 675 (4th Cir. 2016).
Anderson, 820 F.3d at 676.
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A. Intrinsic Methods of Statutory Interpretation
When a statute is ambiguous, tools of statutory interpretation can be
employed to determine how the Legislature intended courts to interpret the
statute.144 In employing these tools of statutory interpretation, the text of the
statute itself is always the starting point.145
1. Plain Meaning
Absent evidence to the contrary, words in a statute should be interpreted in
accordance with their plain meaning.146 Dictionaries are instructive on the
plain meaning of operative words in a statute.147 In Clark, the Seventh Circuit
determined that “cure” meant “to remedy, rectify, restore” based on the
definition of cure found in Webster’s Third International Dictionary.148 Similar
to the definition proffered by the Second Circuit, Merriam-Webster’s
dictionary defines “cure” as “to deal with in a way that eliminates or rectifies”
or “to free from something objectionable or harmful.”149 Black’s Law
Dictionary defines cure in the context of maritime law, as the “restoration to
health after disease or injury.”150 Though the context is different than the one
at issue here, Black’s definition is consistent, in that a cure restores conditions
to what they were before a particular occurrence.151
In Taddeo the court described a default as “an event in the debtor-creditor
relationship which triggers certain consequences.”152 The plain meaning of
“cure” requires that the curative provisions in § 1322(b) be interpreted to allow
a debtor to include provisions in his plan to restore him to his pre-default
conditions.153 Most promissory notes provide that the creditor can accelerate
the debt if the homeowner defaults.154 Though acceleration is the most
common consequence when a homeowner fails to make his mortgage payment,
it may not be the only consequence.155 Therefore, restoring the debtor to his
144
United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 562 (1940) (“The meaning to be ascribed to an Act of the
Legislature can only be derived from a considered weighing of every relevant aid to construction.”).
145
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681. 696–97 (1985).
146
In re Clark, 738 F.2d at 872.
147
See id.
148
Id.
149
CURE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cure (last visited Oct. 22, 2016).
150
Cure, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
151
See id.
152
In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 26.
153
In re Clark, 738 F.2d at 872.
154
Id.
155
See id.
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pre-bankruptcy conditions may require more than deceleration of his mortgage
debt.156 For example, in Anderson, restoring the debtors to their pre-bankruptcy
conditions required that they be allowed to make their post-petition payments
at their pre-default interest rate in addition to mortgage deceleration.157
2. Avoidance of Redundancy
There is a presumption that Congress is not redundant when drafting and
enacting statutes.158 Therefore, reviewers and courts should give effect to every
word in the statute.159 The curative power provision in § 1322(b)(5) begins
with the phrase “notwithstanding § 1322(b)(2) of this subsection.”160 To
disregard this phrase goes against the presumption that Congress avoids
redundancy.161 Congress included the “notwithstanding” clause to remedy the
tension between the cure and modification provisions, demonstrating
Congress’ recognition that a cure may, sometime, modify the creditors’
contractually agreed upon rights.162 The notwithstanding clause establishes that
the scope of a cure is not restricted by the modification prohibition in
§ 1322(b)(2).163
3. Consistent Usage
When words are used more than once in a statute, they should be
interpreted to have the same meaning each time they are used.164 The broad
interpretation of a cure is consistent with the way the term is used throughout
the Code.
Section 365 of the Code allows a trustee to assume executory contracts and
unexpired leases.165 However, if the debtor has defaulted on the contract or
lease, § 365(b)(1)(A) states that a trustee may not assume the contract or lease,
unless at the time of assumption the debtor “cures, or provides adequate

156

Contra Anderson, 820 F.3d at 674.
See id. at 670.
158
See id. at 674 (citing Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States EPA, 942 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1991)
(“ . . . giving effect to each and every word and making every effort not to interpret a provision in a manner
than renders other provisions . . . inconsistent, meaningless, or superfluous.”)
159
Id.
160
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (2012).
161
See Anderson, 820 F.3d at 674.
162
Cf. Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 246.
163
In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 28.
164
Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States EPA 942 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1991).
165
11 U.S.C. § 365 (2012).
157

GLOVER_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS2

2017]

12/21/2017 1:58 PM

HOMEOWNER’S BANKRUPTCY BLUES

109

assurance that the trustee will promptly cure, such default.”166 Under
§ 365(b)(1)(A), the debtor’s ability to cure is not restricted by the terms and
period provided for in the contract.167 As such, the debtor’s curative power is
broad.168 The result of the debtor curing the default on his lease or contract is
that the contractual consequences of the default are repealed, consistent with
the broad interpretation of a cure.169
Chapter 11 of the Code also discusses the debtor’s ability to cure a
default.170 Section 1124 of the Code outlines when a class of claims is not
impaired and consequently is permitted to vote on a chapter 11 plan.171 Under
§ 1124(1) the plan can leave a class of claims unimpaired by not altering the
legal, equitable, and contractual rights of the creditor.172 Section 1124(2)(A)
provides that:
(2) notwithstanding any contractual provision or applicable law
that entitles the holder of such claim or interest to demand or
receive accelerated payment of such claim or interest after the
occurrence of a default—
(A) cures any such default that occurred before or after the
commencement of the case under this title, other than a default of
a kind specified in section 365(b)(2) of this title or of a kind that
section 365(b)(2) expressly does not require to be cured;173
The preface of paragraph two emphasizes the debtor’s power to cure despite
the contractual rights of the creditor that would otherwise be enforceable under
state law.174
Despite the preface in § 1124(2), courts have rejected the idea that a cure
under this provision only applies to debt that has been accelerated due to
default.175 The Ninth Circuit stated that the natural reading of references to
default in § 1123 and § 1124 is that “plans may cure all defaults without

166

11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A) (2012).
8 COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 365.06.
168
Id.
169
See id.
170
See 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2012).
171
8 COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 1124.01.
172
Id.
173
11 U.S.C. § 1124(2)(A) (2012).
174
David J. Oliveiri, Annotation, Right of debtor to “de-acceleration” of residential mortgage
indebtedness under Chapter 13 of Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b)), 67 A.L.R. FED. 217
(1984).
175
8 COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 1124.04.
167
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impairing the creditor’s claim, and that such defaults include, but are not
limited to, those defaults resulting in acceleration.”176 The Ninth Circuit
emphasized that the curative provision in § 1124(2)(A) allows a debtor to
avoid all of the consequences of default, not just acceleration.177 Under
§ 1124(2)(A), a cure returns the debtor and the creditor to their pre-default
positions, consistent with the broad interpretation of a cure.178
B. Extrinsic Methods of Statutory Interpretation
1. Legislative History
The Supreme Court has emphasized importance of the spirit of the law, in
addition to the letter, when interpreting a statutory provision.179 A statute’s
legislative history that “shows genesis and evolution” can provide insight on
how Congress intended the courts to interpret the provision.180 The legislative
history surrounding § 1322’s enactment supports a broad interpretation of a
cure.
a. The Drafting Process
The Legislature created the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States in 1970 to help develop the Bankruptcy Code of 1978.181 In 1973
the Commission issued a report containing its findings and recommendations,
and a draft of a bill to reflecting their findings and recommendations.182 The
Commission’s version of § 1322 stated that a plan:

176
Id. (citing Great W. Bank & Trust v. Entz-White Lumber & Supply (In re Entz-White Lumber &
Supply), 850 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1988).
177
Great W. Bank & Trust v. Entz-White Lumber & Supply (In re Entz-White Lumber & Supply), 850
F.2d 1338, 1342 (9th Cir. 1988).
178
See 8 COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 1124.04 (citing In re Centre Court Apartments, Ltd., 85 B.R. 651
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988)). In Centre Court the debtor’ promissory note stated that if the creditor had to seek
payment of the debt by law or through an attorney the debtor must pay the creditor reasonable attorney’s fees
and costs of collections. The court considered whether the creditor was entitled to these costs after the debtor
cured the mortgage. The court held that the creditor was not entitled to attorney’s fees because the cure and
reinstatement returned the parties to a point in time prior to the default and acceleration.
179
Treat v. White, 181 U.S. 264, 267–68 (1901) (citing Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143
U.S. 457 (1892) (“There are times when the mere letter of a statute does not control, and that a fair
consideration of the surroundings may indicate that which is within the letter is not within the spirit, and
therefore must be excluded from its scope.”)).
180
Anderson, 820 F.3d at 674.
181
Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 238.
182
Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 238.
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(2) May include provisions dealing with claims secured by
personal property severally, on any terms, and may provide for
the curing of defaults within a reasonable time and otherwise alter
or modify the rights of the holders of such claims.
(4) May include provisions for the curing of defaults within a
reasonable time while the case is pending on claims secured by a
lien on the debtor’s residence and on unsecured claims or claims
secured by personal property on which the last payment is due
after completion by the debtor of all payments made under the
plan.183
In an explanatory note the Commission emphasized the powers granted to
debtors under paragraph (4).184 The Commission stated that the provision
allowed debtors to “keep current on long-term debt by provisions in the plan
for curing defaults and maintaining payments.”185 In this report, the
Commission highlighted the maintenance of payments and the debtor’s ability
to cure his default as interrelated but separate things.186
The Fourth Circuit in Anderson, insisted that the curative powers only
allowed a debtor to continue making payment on what would have otherwise
been matured debt.187 However, the Commission clearly did not intend for the
curative powers to be restricted in this way. Otherwise, it would have been
redundant for the Commission’s version of the provision and explanatory note
to emphasize the debtor’s ability to cure and maintain his payments.
As originally drafted by the House of Representatives, paragraphs (2) and
(5) of § 1322 stated that a plan may:
(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims or of holders of
unsecured claims;
(5) provide for the curing or waiving of any default within a
reasonable time and maintenance of payments while the case is
pending on any unsecured claim or secured claim on which the
last payment is due after the date on which the final payment
under the plan is due;188

183

BANKRUPTCY LAWS COMMISSION REPORT, H.R. DOC. NO. 93–137, at 204 (1973) (emphasis added).
Id. at 205–06.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Anderson, 820 F.3d at 674.
188
A Bill to Establish a Uniform Law on the Subject of Bankruptcies, H.R. 6, 95th Cong. § 1322(b)(2),
(5) (as referred to the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Jan. 4, 1977).
184
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The Senate amended paragraph (2), prohibiting modifications of the rights of
holders of claims secured by a mortgage of real property.189 Congress
generally wanted to afford added protections from modifications to home
mortgage lenders for the valuable service that they provide to society: making
homeownership attainable.190 Consequently, paragraph (2) was amended once
more to restrict the modification prohibition only to claims secured by a
mortgage on real property that was the debtor’s principal residence.191
Congress recognized that the modification prohibition in paragraph (2) and
the debtor’s curative power granted in paragraph (5) were in tension with each
other. In some circumstances, a cure of a default may require that a creditor’s
rights be modified. Consequently, Congress amended paragraph (5) to include
a provision that the curative powers remained intact “notwithstanding” the
modification prohibition in paragraph (2).192 This “notwithstanding” clause
emphasized Congress’ intention that the debtor’s ability to cure his default not
be restricted by the modification prohibition of paragraph (2). Though
Congress intended to afford some protection to mortgage lenders, it did not
intend to do so at the expense of inhibiting the debtor’s ability to cure his
default.193
b. The Congressional Hearings
During the initial phases of the drafting process of chapter 13, Congress
heard testimony from individuals who represent some of the biggest secured
creditors in the nation.194 The representatives did not advance concerns about
the debtor’s ability to cure his default under the proposed bill.
Walter Vaughn, Vice President of the American Security Bank and
Chairman of both the American Bankers Association Task Force on
Bankruptcy and the Consumer Bankers Association, presented his concerns on
the Commission’s draft recommendations.195 One year prior to Walter
Vaughn’s testimony, state and national banks had outstanding consumer loans
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totaling approximately eighty-four billion dollars.196 The member banks of the
organizations Vaughn represented accounted for a significant majority of that
eighty-four billion dollars of outstanding loans.197
Vaughn raised concerns about the portion of the Commission’s bill that
allowed the rights of secured creditors to be modified and the debtor to cure his
default.198 Though Vaughn had some concerns about secured creditors’ ability
to protect their rights, Vaughn stated that he and the banks he represented
supported the provision.199 The only amendment suggested by Vaughn dealt
with the preservation of the value of the claims under the plan.200 He did not,
however, raise concerns about the debtor’s ability to cure his default, so long
as the value of the creditor’s claim was not impaired.
Alvin Wiese, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Bankruptcy of the Law
Forum of the National Consumer Finance Association and attorney
specializing in creditor’s rights and consumer bankruptcy, also presented on
behalf of the interests of secured creditors.201 Mr. Weise was extremely critical
of the Commission’s bill. Mr. Weise accused the Commission’s bill of being
slighted in favor of the debtor.202 He stated
The objective of the Commission is admirable but it must be
legislatively balanced to insure the continued availability of home
financing and consumer credit upon which our economy is, so
dependent, and it must be structured so as to preserve and protect
the rights of creditors to their collateral and against those who
abuse the bankruptcy process through fraud, deception, or
dishonesty. Further, it should be structured to encourage sound
money management practices by consumers.203
Mr. Weise believed that the Commission’s bill promoted bankruptcy and
excused fraud, and he feared this would result in an increase in the amount of
individuals filing for bankruptcy.204 He urged Congress against creating a
bankruptcy regime that would result in the erosion of credit morality (which is
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the presumption that the consumer is honest and intends to repay his debt, of
which the creditor relies on in extending loans to consumers).205 He warned
that the Commission’s bill, as written, would lead to a decline in the amount of
home mortgage and other consumer loans creditors were willing to extend to
individuals.206
Despite Mr. Weise’s immense criticism of the bill, he did not raise any
issues about the cure provisions that became § 1322(b)(5) of the Code.207 Even
when questioned about his criticism of chapter 13 following his address to
Congress, Mr. Weise never mentioned the curative provisions.208
2. Public Policy
The public policy behind the enactment of a statue, along with the policy
implications of interpreting a statutory provision in a particular manner, also
provides guidance on the meaning of a statutory provision.209 An
understanding of the policy goals of a statutory provision sheds lights on its
meaning because “[l]aws are not abstract propositions,” rather, “[t]hey are
expressions of policy arising out of specific situations and addressed to the
attainment of particular ends.”210
a. The Goal of Bankruptcy: Relief to the Debtor
One of the primary goals of bankruptcy is to provide a fresh start for the
“honest but unfortunate” debtor.211 One leading bankruptcy scholar has said:
Consumer bankruptcy has become part of America’s economic
landscape. Once regarded as an unlikely legal alternative chosen
by only a few desperate families, bankruptcy has become a refuge
for one in every 96 American families by the time the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission filed its report.212
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A fresh start will give the debtor “a new opportunity in life, free from the
pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debts.213 There are several
justifications for the fresh start policy.214
First, the fresh start policy protects society from the honest but unfortunate
debtor.215 An overwhelmed debtor with no avenue for relief may eventually
lose his will to be productive at all, and society will have to bear the burden of
the debtor’s unproductivity.216 The debtor’s unproductivity may result in an
inability to support himself and his dependents.217 Society would then have to
allocate resources to the support of the debtor.218 Additionally, the debtor may
experience personal hardships, such as divorce or even suicide, because of his
lack of relief from unmanageable debt.219 These things would also have a
negative and costly effect on society.220 By providing the debtor with a fresh
start, bankruptcy seeks to avoid these costs for society and restore the debtor to
a state of productivity.221
Second, the fresh start policy protects the honest but unfortunate debtor
from himself.222 The fresh start policy recognizes that bad judgment is
inevitable to the human condition.223 Consequently, a debtor may incur
excessive debt as a result of overestimating his abilities to repay his debts or
underestimating the risk of incurring the debt.224 Additionally, the fresh start
policy protects the debtor who may lack the sophistication and knowledge
necessary to make wise financial decisions, and to protect the debtor from
predatory lending.225
Third, the fresh start policy protects the creditor. Secondary to providing a
fresh start for the debtor, the other goal of bankruptcy is to distribute the
debtor’s assets equitably amongst his creditors.226 When a debtor experiences a
213
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financial hardship, he more than likely has many creditors to which he owes a
debt. Under state law, to collect on a defaulted debt, a creditor must obtain a
judgement lien on property of the debtor and seize the property.227 Not only is
this process time consuming and costly but by the time a creditor obtains the
judgment, the property may be encumbered by another creditor’s lien, also
seeking to collect on a defaulted debt. 228
The narrow interpretation of a cure proffered by the Fourth Circuit in
Anderson is inconsistent with the fresh start policy. By restricting the debtor’s
curative power, the court denied the debtors the opportunity to have a fresh
start. The court chose not to restore the debtor to its pre-bankruptcy conditions,
robbing them of an opportunity to have a fresh start, contrary to the policy
goals that the Code was enacted to advance.
b. The Cost of Foreclosure
Though about ninety-six percent of chapter 13 debtors are homeowners and
seventy-nine percent of chapter 13 plans provide for payment of arrearages,
only one percent of those debtors successful save their homes.229 The other
debtors are left to the mercy of state law and their mortgage companies. The
result is often foreclosure. However, researchers and policy-makers agree that
foreclosure should be avoided whenever possible because of the high costs to
all parties involved.230 Foreclosure is not only costly to the debtor, but it is also
extremely costly for the mortgage lender and society.231
Foreclosure is taxing on a borrower tangibly and intangibly. The borrower
must bear the financing costs of relocating.232 Additionally, the borrower must
bear the emotional burdens of being displaced: guilt, embarrassment, and
sometime depression.233 Children may have to change schools or school
districts, possibly mid-academic year.234 The borrower must deal with the loss
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of his ties to his neighborhood and his sense of community.235 In more extreme
cases, the cost of foreclosure for the borrower is homelessness.236
Foreclosure is also costly for the mortgage lender.237 Foreclosure imposes
high transaction costs on the mortgage lender.238 During the sub-prime
mortgage crisis, between 2006 and the first quarter of 2007, twenty-three
lenders filed for bankruptcy as a result of defaulting debtors in foreclosure and
the associated transaction costs.239 Additionally, homes typically are resold at
foreclosure auctions for much less than the actual value of the home.240
Further, foreclosure’s effect on the housing industry has a domino effect on
the insurance industry.241 A reduction in homeownership results in a reduction
of the demand for homeowner’s insurance coverage.242 Moreover, foreclosure
increases the rate of insurance fraud.243 For example, desperate homeowners
sometime resort to arson to avoid foreclosure.244 Temporal pressures imposed
by state law can often lead to settlements and big pay-outs by the insurance
companies without a thorough investigation.245
Society also suffers as a result of foreclosures.246 Foreclosed homes are
often left unattended and unmaintained, making it an eyesore for the
surrounding neighborhood and a magnet for illegal activity and squatters.247
These blighted, foreclosed homes can drive down the property value of the
homes surrounding it.248 A study showed that every foreclosed home reduced
the property value of the other homes in the neighborhood by one percent.249
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Foreclosure also reduces the amount of property tax payments in a locality.250
This is inimical to municipalities who rely on property taxes to fund things like
education.251 Additionally, foreclosure forces down the price of homes, making
it more difficult for homeowners to refinance their loans, and ultimately
leading to more foreclosures.252
The societal cost of foreclosure is best summarized as a no-win situation
for everyone. Therefore, it is absurd to interpret § 1322(b) in a manner that
would make foreclosure a more likely result for chapter 13. Restricting a
debtor’s ability to cure his default to only deceleration of his debt makes a
debtor’s small chances of saving his home even smaller, particularly when
acceleration was not the only consequence of default. The broad interpretation
of a cure is more consistent with the policy goal of avoiding the high costs of
foreclosure to the borrower, creditor, and society.
III. CRITICISM OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S REASONING IN ANDERSON
The Fourth Circuit in Anderson, based its narrow interpretation of a cure
on its analysis of the text of the statute, legislative history, and policy concerns.
The court’s reasoning, however, was rooted in a failure to apply tools of
statutory interpretation correctly and thoroughly.
A. Anderson’s Textual Analysis of § 1322(b)(2)
The Court in Anderson decided to interpret the text of § 1322(b)(2). In
doing so, the Fourth Circuit asserted that the statute should be read “as a
whole, giving effect to each and every word and making every effort not to
interpret a provision in a manner that renders other provisions . . . inconsistent,
meaningless, or superfluous.”253 The court reasoned that Congress did not
intend for a cure to allow debtors to return to their pre-default interest rate
because such a reading would “inexplicably make (b)(2) inoperative by means
of a capacious power to cure written only a few sentences later.”254
Respectfully, the Fourth Circuit was gravely incorrect. An interpretation of
cure that would restore the debtors to their pre-default condition would not
make the modification prohibition in § 1322(b)(2) inoperative. For example,
250
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§ 1322(b)(2)’s protection for home mortgage lenders against cramdown would
remain unscathed by the debtor’s curative power.255 Cramdown, the most
common treatment of secured creditors in chapter 13 cases, allows a debtor to
mimic foreclosure and give the secured creditor other property equal to the
present value of the collateral.256 A debtor’s obligation to pay his secured
creditor can be crammed down by property such as promissory notes and other
obligations of the debtor.257 Cramdown also advances the fresh start for the
debtor policy goal of bankruptcy at the expense of secured creditors.258 Section
1322(b)(2)’s modification prohibition exempts home mortgage lenders from
this type of disadvantageous treatment259
Additionally, a debtor may only a cure a default. Any alteration in the
contractually agreed upon obligations of the debtor proposed in the plan not for
the sole purpose of returning the debtor to his pre-default conditions is
forbidden by § 1322(b)(2). For example, a debtor cannot propose a plan that
lowers his interest rate on his home mortgage loan simply because it is more
desirable than his current interest rate. 260
The Fourth Circuit was incorrect in its reasoning that a broad interpretation
of the debtor’s curative powers would render § 1322(b)(2)’s modification
prohibition inoperative. Restoring a debtor to his pre-default conditions does
not interfere with § 1322(b)(2)’s safeguards afforded to home mortgage
creditors from cramdown and modifications by debtors seeking mortgage
terms more desirable than those that they originally negotiated with their
lender.
It is a principle of statutory interpretation that the same meaning is
intended each time a term is used in a statute, unless the statute explicitly states
otherwise. The Fourth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of a cure in § 1322(b)
would lead to inconsistencies if applied to other provisions in the Code that use
the term. The narrow interpretation of a cure proffered in Anderson only
255
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permits a debtor to decelerate his debt.261 This interpretation does not make
sense in the context of § 365(b)(1)(A), since acceleration is not a consequence
of default under executory contracts and leases. Congress would not intend
“cure” to mean one thing in one part of the Code and something different in
another part of the Code without expressly saying so.262
B. Anderson’s Legislative History Analysis
After performing a textual analysis, the court analyzed the legislative
history to determine the intent of the legislature when it enacted § 1322(b)(2).
The court in Anderson also justified it’s narrow interpretation of “cure” with
the legislative history surrounding § 1322(b)’s enactment.263 However, the
court did not actually cite any legislative history directly.264 Instead, it relied
on the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of the legislative history in Grubbs.265 Grubbs’
analysis of the legislative history was framed around the question of whether
allowing debtors to pay arrearages on previously accelerated debt was a
permissible cure or forbidden modification.266 Therefore, the court in Anderson
should have expounded on Grubbs’ analysis, focusing on what the history says
about where Congress intended to draw the line when the consequences of
default went beyond acceleration of the mortgage debt.
The Fourth Circuit also quotes the language in Grubbs that during
Congress’ meetings, home mortgage creditors’ “attacks concentrated upon
provisions that permitted modification of a secured claim by reducing the
amount of periodic installments due thereupon.”267 Congress’ response to the
concerns of home mortgage creditors was not to limit the curative powers of
the debtor in the way the Fourth Circuit claims.268 Rather, as discussed above,
the Legislature responded by exempting home mortgage creditors from
cramdown, which would have otherwise reduced the installment amounts that
debtors were required to pay over the life of the plan from the value of the
outstanding debt to the present value of the collateral.269
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C. Anderson’s Policy Analysis
First, the Fourth Circuit also did a policy analysis of the narrow
interpretation of cure that it proffered, focusing on the need to protect default
interest rates.270 Subsequently, the court asserted that default interest rates
benefit both creditors and consumers.271 In asserting the dual benefit of the
default interest rates, the court acknowledged default interest rates as serving
two important purposes for creditors: to compensate creditors for the time
value of money and to compensate creditors for the risk associated with
extending credit.272 However, the court warned that in the absence of the
enforcement of default interest rates, creditors may issue loans with higher
interest rates throughout the entire life of the plan or seek to foreclose on a
defaulted debtor more quickly.273 Lastly, there was an argument provided by
the court. The argument proffered that in order to incentivize secured creditors
to make home mortgage loans available to consumers, Congress was
compelled to legislate in a way that would assure lenders that their
“expectations would not be frustrated.”274
The court’s analysis completely failed to address the policy implications of
its narrow interpretation on the primary purpose of bankruptcy: to provide a
fresh start for the poor and unfortunate debtor.275 In its analysis, the court
claims that the fresh start policy goal of bankruptcy does not justify a reading
of the statute that “must perforce to be inimical to the welfare of mortgage
debtors.”276 The argument offered by the court states that Congress intended a
reading of the statute inimical to the welfare of the debtor. Another argument
offered by the court is that to avoid decreasing “the attractiveness of home
mortgages as investment opportunities,” Congress intended to draft a provision
that would promote the interests of the creditor. However, even as the
provision benefits creditors, it operates at the expense of the debtor.277 In
aggregate, the aforementioned arguments are inconsistent with the primary
goal of bankruptcy.278
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The court’s policy analysis also aggrandizes default interest rates as a
desirable alternative to foreclosure.279 On the contrary, for a defaulted debtor,
higher interest rates further frustrate the debtor’s ability to save his home. If
the debtor experiences a financial hardship and defaults on the lower interest
rate, it is almost certain that he will be unable to make the mortgage payments
with the higher rate of interest. The debtor will fall further and further behind,
the mortgage creditor will proceed with foreclosure proceedings, and the
amount required to reinstate the debtor’s mortgage will be higher because of
the increased monthly mortgage payments, which reflect the higher interest
rate.
Anderson’s policy analysis also emphasizes the importance of allowing
mortgage creditors to get exactly what they would have gotten outside of
bankruptcy.280 If all creditors retained the same rights in bankruptcy as they did
outside of bankruptcy, the Code “would have no provisions at all.”281
Therefore, it is irrational that Congress intended the statute to be interpreted in
a manner where creditors could expect to be treated as if the debtor had never
filed a petition.
Thus, Anderson’s policy analysis fails to adequately address the effect of
its interpretation of a cure on the consumer debtor and his ability to obtain
relief. Rather, its policy analysis focuses on the furtherance of the creditor’s
interest to the detriment of the debtor.282 The court in Anderson failed to
thoroughly analyze the policy surrounding its interpretation.283 Consequently,
the Fourth Circuit restricted the curative powers to be far narrower in scope
than Congress intended.
D. Anderson’s Distinctions Between a “Cure” and a “Modification”
Following the court’s analysis of the legislative history, the court attempted
to make distinctions between a “cure” and a “modification” for purposes of
understanding § 1322(b)(2). The Fourth Circuit cited Nobelman’s
interpretation of the rights protected by the anti-modification provision in
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§ 1322(b)(2).284 The court held that returning the debtors to their pre-default
interest rate was a prohibited modification according to Nobelman, because
doing so was a deviation from what was in the promissory note.285 The Fourth
Circuit reasoned that the anti-modification provision in § 1322(b)(2) prohibited
debtors from altering the mortgage lender’s contractually agreed upon rights
contained in the mortgage instrument.286
Next, the Fourth Circuit went on in the opinion to contradict its own
analysis of Nobelman. The debtor’s promissory note in Anderson not only
provided that the creditor could increase the debtor’s interest rate upon default,
but also granted the creditors rights to accelerate the debtor’s mortgage debt
and commence foreclosure proceedings.287 The Fourth Circuit drew an
arbitrary line between what contractual rights infringements of the creditor
constitute a permissible cure and what infringements constitute a forbidden
modification. Though the promissory note granted the creditor contractual
rights to take either action against the defaulted debtor, the court held that a
plan that provided for the deceleration of the mortgage debt constituted a cure,
but a plan that provided for the restoration of the debtors to their pre-default
interest rates constituted a forbidden modification.288
The Fourth Circuit also failed to address all the relevant arguments made
by the Court in Nobelman regarding what rights § 1322(b)(2) protects from
modification in a chapter 13 repayment plan.289 The Fourth Circuit quoted
Nobelman’s language stating that the protected rights are those that are
“‘bargained for by the mortgagor and the mortgagee and enforceable under
state law.”290 In the subsequent paragraph, the Court in Nobelman stated:
This is not to say, of course, that the contractual rights of a home
mortgage lender are unaffected by the mortgagor’s [c]hapter 13
bankruptcy. The lender’s power to enforce its rights—and, in
particular, its right to foreclose on the property in the event of
default—is checked by the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay
284
Anderson, 820 F.3d at 673 (citing Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 329). The court went on to say, “courts
have accordingly ‘interpreted the nomodification provision of § 1322(b)(2) to prohibit any fundamental
alteration in a debtor’s obligations, e.g., lowering monthly payments, converting a variable interest rate to a
fixed interest rate, or extending the repayment term of a note.” Anderson, 820 F.3d at 673 (quoting In re
Litton, 330 F.3d at 643).
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provision . . . . In addition, § 1322(b)(5) permits the debtor to cure
prepetition defaults on a home mortgage by paying off arrearages
over the life of the plan “notwithstanding” the exception in
§ 1322(b)(2).291
However, the Fourth Circuit in Anderson did not discuss this language in
Nobelman, citing the automatic stay and curative provisions as permissible
infringements on the creditor’s rights in its analysis.292
CONCLUSION
Filing chapter 13 bankruptcy is often a defaulted debtor’s only means of
saving his home from foreclosure. Chapter 13 allows a homeowner debtor to
construct a repayment plan that provides for the payment of his mortgage
arrearages over the life of the plan, while maintaining the current payments as
they become due. Debtors seeking to reinstate their defaulted mortgage rely on
the power granted to them in § 1322(b)(3) and (5) of the Code to “cure” any
defaults. This is best done by amending the anti-modification provision in
§ 1322(b)(2) to include that a cure of a default under paragraphs (3) and (5) of
this subsection is not a modification of the creditor’s rights for purposes of this
section.
Currently, the Code does not define “cure.” As a result of there being no
clear definition of “cure,” it is left up to the courts to define the scope of
curative powers. Until April 2016, before the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in
Anderson, the circuits have interpreted the curative powers broadly, stating that
a cure returns the debtor to the position that he was in prior to defaulting on his
mortgage debt. In Anderson, however, the Fourth Circuit split from this
interpretation, narrowing the scope of the curative powers to only decelerating
the accelerated mortgage debt and allowing the defaulted debtor to continue
making payments.
In Anderson, the Fourth Circuit held that restoring the debtors to their predefault interest rate was a prohibited modification under § 1322(b)(2). The
court arbitrarily drew a line between what constitutes a permissible cure under
§ 1322(b) and what constitutes a forbidden modification. The Fourth Circuit
attempted to justify its position with an interpretation of the text of the statute,
the legislative history surrounding § 1322(b)’s enactment, the policy
implications, and the Supreme Court’s guidance on what “rights” are protected
291
292
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from modifications by § 1322(b)(2). However, the court failed to consider key
points in its analysis to the detriment of the debtors.
The text of the statute, the legislative history, and public policy support a
broad interpretation of a cure, unrestricted by the anti-modification provision
in § 1322(b)(2). The plain meaning of the word “cure” supports an
interpretation that would restore the debtor to his pre-default conditions. Also,
a reading of the statute that gives effect to every word in the statute scrutinized
and selected by the legislature demonstrates that when the curative and antimodification provisions are in tension with each other, the anti-modification
provision should not be read as a restriction on the debtor’s power to cure his
default. This interpretation is also consistent with “cure” as it is used in other
provisions of the Code. These interpretations of the text are supported by the
series of amendments to the provisions during the legislative process, before it
became law.
A broad interpretation of the debtor’s curative powers is also supported by
its associated policy implications. Bankruptcy’s goal is to provide a fresh start
for the overburdened debtor while simultaneously providing ratable recoveries
to creditors. Therefore, the Code should not be interpreted in a way that
advances the interests of the creditor to the detriment of the debtor,
discouraging debtors from using bankruptcy as a tool of debt relief and hurting
both debtor and creditor. Further, chapter 13 repayment plans are often a
debtor’s only avenue for saving his home from foreclosure. Foreclosure is
detrimental to the individual, the creditor, as well as the community. Therefore,
the Code should be interpreted in a way that would avoid this detriment while
benefiting everyone.
Congress should therefore amend the Code to include a provision that
defines a cure as a debtor’s ability to nullify the consequences of default and
restore the debtor to his pre-default conditions. Additionally, Congress should
amend the anti-modification provision in § 1322(b)(2) to include that a cure of
a default under paragraphs (3) and (5) of this subsection is not a modification
of the creditor’s rights for purposes of this section.
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